Power Transition in Tajikistan: Rahmon’s Failed Mission to Convince Putin
According to several reliable sources, during the visit of the Russian delegation to Tajikistan (8–10 October), informal negotiations took place after the official part (11–12 October). During these talks, Emomali Rahmon attempted to persuade Vladimir Putin to agree to the transfer of power to his son, Rustam Emomali. He claimed that, by virtue of his constitutional privileges as the “Founder of Peace and National Unity,” the “Leader of the Nation,” and the “Guarantor of the Constitution,” he would be able to maintain control over the political system and safeguard Rustam’s authority after his appointment as president. In this way, Rahmon sought to guarantee the continuity of his regime and preserve the country’s pro-Russian course after his death.
However, Putin refused to support this scenario and did not propose an alternative. The Kremlin believes that Rustam Emomali is untrustworthy and an unpredictable politician. For this reason, Moscow is interested in ensuring that Emomali Rahmon remains in power until the very end. During the visit, Putin avoided any personal meetings with Rustam, limiting himself to a brief protocol introduction in the presence of members of both delegations. This underscored the Kremlin’s cold attitude toward the idea of dynastic succession, which could, in the long term, become a destabilizing factor for the regime—especially given that Russia, waging an aggressive war against Ukraine, finds itself in an extremely vulnerable position and is no longer capable of guaranteeing protection for the Tajik regime or its continuity.
It should also be taken into account that within Rahmon’s own regime, serious confrontation is growing among various elite groups and security structures. Some influential figures do not support the scenario of transferring power to Rustam Emomali, fearing the loss of their own positions and the redistribution of financial flows. These internal contradictions deepen the instability of the system and make any attempt at a power transition a potential trigger for political crisis.
At the same time, Moscow uses Tajikistan as a strategic hub for circumventing international sanctions and as an instrument of geopolitical manipulation, employing the country in its shadow economic and political operations. Dushanbe’s dependence on the Kremlin manifests not only in the military and political spheres but also in the economy: Rahmon’s regime has for decades relied on Russian loans, energy supplies, and remittances from labor migrants. These mechanisms provide Moscow with powerful levers of pressure, turning Tajikistan into an economic vassal of Russia.
The Kremlin seeks, at all costs, to keep Emomali Rahmon in power, viewing him as a guarantor of Russian influence in Tajikistan. However, among the younger generation of Tajikistan, anti-Russian sentiment and the desire for an independent policy are rapidly growing. An increasing number of citizens are realizing that the preservation of Rahmon’s dictatorship is not a guarantee of stability but rather a path toward national catastrophe and the loss of state sovereignty.
In its effort to strengthen its influence and protect Rahmon’s regime from destabilization, the Kremlin has moved toward the institutional formalization of cooperation between law-enforcement structures. Putin and Emomali Rahmon signed an agreement on the establishment of mutual representations of the Ministries of Internal Affairs: Russia — in Dushanbe, and Tajikistan — in Moscow. Formally, the document concerns the fight against crime and migration, but in reality, it is aimed at strengthening Moscow’s control over the Tajik diaspora and the country’s internal politics.
The agreement creates a legal basis for the presence of Russian intelligence services (the FSB and the GRU) under the cover of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and deepens their cooperation with Tajik structures. This allows Moscow to systematically and on a large scale direct Tajik citizens to fight against Ukraine and to expand its influence over Dushanbe’s policies.
In the year preceding the signing of the agreement, the presence of FSB and GRU officers formally seconded to the 201st military base increased in Tajikistan. The new agreement effectively legalized their active recruitment activities among Tajik citizens for participation in the war against Ukraine and granted them expanded powers, as well as protection under diplomatic immunity.
For Rahmon’s regime, the agreement has become an instrument for expanding control over migrants and the opposition. It strengthens pressure and repression abroad, creating an atmosphere of fear among Tajik migrants in Russia.
The narcotics trade, entirely controlled by Rahmon’s family, benefits Russian intelligence services as well, becoming an element of their mutual dependence.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the people inside the country and the Tajik diaspora abroad may become the decisive force for future change.
Today, Rahmon is under Putin’s direct control. The Russian military base is located just ten kilometers from his residence and serves as a symbol of Dushanbe’s total dependence on the Kremlin. For more than thirty-four years, the people of Tajikistan have not elected their president — he has been appointed by Moscow.
The current regime in Tajikistan is not an independent authority but rather an occupation regime of Russia, which has become a real threat to the existence and future of the Tajik state.
Sharofiddin Gadoev
Chairman of the Movement for Reforms and Development of Tajikistan
28 October 2025
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
